The authors confirmed E. Z. Rothkopf and M. L. Dashen's (1995) finding that specific problem context, such as thematic surface features, forms associative connections with deep problem features and thus speeds particular decisions (particularization). In 5 experiments, using a 3-bit decision task and prememorized decision rules, the authors found that the ability of a situational context to reinstate was decreased by its replacement by another modal surface context. Context reinstatement, as measured by decision speed, depended on both global and recent local densities of specific problem features linked to a particular decision. The authors' results are consistent with J. R. Anderson and L. J. Schooler's (1991) needs/odds analysis and suggest a push-down file model for diverse context influences as a mechanism for responding to changing situational demands.
Recall and problem solving are facilitated by the reinstatement of the situational context in which relevant information was acquired or is customarily used. It is not known, however, whether subsequent use of the information in other contexts alters the original context's capability to reinstate. The consequences of such changes on rule-guided problem solving are the heart of the present work. We wanted to find out whether successive changes in the modal problem context have cumulative effects, in the sense that such changes will affect the capability of other familiar contexts to reinstate. The issue is of special interest because becoming an expert problem solver usually involves a broadening of the situational context in which information is used.
Reinstatement in Problem Solving
The important work of Ross (1984 Ross ( , 1987 Ross ( , 1989 has shown that optional surface problem elements of probability word problems, such as their thematic content, can remind problem solvers of a previous use of a particular probability formula and prompt its use. For example, an instructive demonstration on how to calculate permutations that involved the assignment of mechanics to cars in a garage transferred better to other garage problems than to analogous problems involving assignments of computers to scientists. Other studies have found that speed and accuracy in making choices and in rule-based categorization depended not only on mastery of the rules but also on surface resemblance between the current problem and previous learning episodes (see, e.g., Brooks, Norman, & Allen, 1991; Pashler & Baylis, 1991a , 1991b Whittlesea & Dorken, 1993) . These results have been interpreted as substantial evidence that surface problem features or other contextual elements can become linked in memory to deep problem features and to choices of particular solutions or solution procedures.
Deep Problem Features and Types of Situational Context
Problems that can be solved by the application of rigorous rules have deep features that determine what principles are applicable for their solution (see Gagné, 1977) . They also have variable surface (contextual) features that may be (a) any of a wide range of integral surface elements that are linked in an orderly way to deep features and (b) situational factors, such as location or time, that are only adventitiously related to the problem. Together, these two types of surface characteristics can generate a very large feature space for any class of problems. For example, in a ruleguided choice of a statistical test to compare two sets of measures, this space is delineated by (a) the many different integral surface characteristics which are logically linked to critical deep features such as independence of samples and distribution and (b) elements incidental to the problem at hand, such as subjects, physical measures, or situational contexts that are not logically connected to deep problem features but may be accidentally correlated with them in any person's experience. In his studies of principle-guided problem solving, Ross (1984 Ross ( , 1987 Ross ( , 1989 demonstrated that specific, optional characteristics, which were logically tied to deep features, can become associatively linked to deep problem elements. Associative linkages with adventitious, situational elements such as room locations, however, have been inferred mainly from learning studies. 1 The present research focuses on surface problem characteristics that were logically linked to deep features. Particularization Ross (1984 Ross ( , 1987 , and nearly all of the reinstatement studies cited above, used the likelihood of a particular decision as the main dependent measure. Rothkopf and Dashen (1995) have reported speeding of problem-solving decisions by reinstatement of integral contextual features that have been seen with only one of the several problem solutions for which these features were logical indicators. In these studies, decisions were made by applying well-mastered, exact, categorical decision rules to verbally presented problems that could be generated from a very large domain of features. Their experimental task, which was also used in the present work, involved the choice of one of eight routes on the basis of binary categorization of each of three components of a fictional shipping order (patterned after Wright & Reid, 1973) . Using decision rules that had been memorized beforehand, participants were asked to select one of eight routes on the basis of shipper (a private person or a firm), cargo (food or manufactured, non-food items), and destination (foreign or domestic). The deep features calling for the white route, for example, was for shipments by a firm of food to a domestic destination. A large number of shipment orders (e.g., Acme Enterprises, apples, Idaho) could be generated for each of the eight routing selections because any class of deep features could be instantiated, by various surface characteristics, in a very large number of ways. Any deep feature (such as food) was appropriate for four routing decisions. The experimental manipulations involved generating problems so that for a particular routing decision (e.g., white) only two instantiations of each feature (e.g., apples and rice for food) were used and these particular instances were not used in any problem calling for a different routing decision than white. Rothkopf and Dashen (1995) called this experimental manipulation and its consequences particularization. Particularization takes place when one or more of a number of optional forms of a problem feature is linked predominantly with only one of the several solutions for which the feature is an indicator. After 512 application problems, Rothkopf and Dashen administered a test and found that although all problems were solved with the same high level of accuracy, problems with the particularized instantiation of the feature categories on which decisions had to be based, were solved more rapidly than other feature instances.
Simplification of Decision Processes by Context Reinstatement
The speeding produced by particularization was attributed to direct cuing of particular routing decisions by particular surface problem elements. Direct cuing required less time than the algorithmic processes that had originally supported the decision and provided the possibility for short-cutting of analytic processes because direct associations between surface features and decisions could outrace execution of the universally applicable solution algorithm. This hypothesis owes a debt to Logan's (1988) instance-based theory of expertise, as well as to Schunn, Reder, Nhouyvanisvong, Richards, and Stroffolino (1997) , and is strongly supported by both studies' findings. Both investigations observed that increasing experience with specific problems resulted in the gradual displacement of algorithmic supports for performance by primary memories that were acquired in previous learning episodes. 2 Rothkopf and Dashen's (1995) findings of direct associations between episodic problem features and decisions based on these deep category features indicated that humans are sensitive to the history of co-occurrences of specific surface problem forms and solutions and that inductive processes continue even after principles have been mastered. From an evolutionary perspective, inductive processes that lead to this speeding or simplification are a potentially useful adaptation to current modal surface forms of problems. Season or circumstances determine the most common surface forms of deep problem features, and circumstances may cause them to change repeatedly. For instance, a veterinarian may find that a parasite, formerly endemic in Holstein cows, is now found mainly in Swiss Browns. In the particularization studies described above, this kind of change in correlations between surface and deep problem features would be equivalent to having the white route (firm, food, domestic destination), after being instantiated primarily by combinations of Acme, Speedco; apples, rice; and Idaho, Virginia, became subsequently instantiated mainly by problems generated from Star Enterprise, Brown Bros.; cheese, lettuce; and Ohio, New Jersey.
Models of Context Change
There are at least two plausible, alternative models of the psychological consequences of context changes. The exhaustive sampling model views the genesis of expert problem solvers as involving repeated sampling of the problem space until most surface features that are correlated with deep features have acquired direct access to decisions and can either circumvent or outrace algorithmic processes. According to this model, each situational context fully preserves its reinstatement capabilities even though more and more contexts become linked to decisions. An alternative conception, the parsimony model, rests on the plausible assumption that a parsimonious way to be adaptive would be to (a) favor the more recent surface manifestations of the deep problem features on which decisions hinge and (b) gradually abandon the old surface prompts. In this model, problem solvers rather modishly adapt themselves to changing demands of the world in a parsimonious fashion. Both models assume that the reinstating power of any situational context, such as the speeding of decisions, increases with experience with that context. The exhaustive sampling model implies that reinstating or cuing capacities of each particularized context are independent of each other. The parsi-2 Describing changes in problem solvers' performance in these situations or in particularization as "remembering an example" neglects this interesting and important distinction. The duality between (a) analytic/constructive and (b) associative/direct episodic supports for performance has been noted in several different areas, including studies of problem solving, concept formation, implicit memory, decision making, and categorization (e.g., Brooks et al., 1991; Pashler & Bayliss, 1991a , 1991b Whittlesea & Dorken, 1993) . Interactions between intentional/ constructive and automatic elements in recall and recognition have also been demonstrated by Jacoby and his associates (e.g., Jacoby, 1991; Jacoby & Brooks, 1984; Jacoby, Woloshyn, & Kelley, 1989) and by others (e.g., Hasher & Zacks, 1979) . The relationships between intentional and automatic aspects of memory are analogous to analytic and associative processes in problem solving because recall can be supported either by direct, primary retrieval or by analysis and reconstruction. mony model, however, implies that performance within any situational context will be sensitive to history with various contexts: The cuing capabilities of earlier modal context will be diminished by subsequent experiences with other situations.
Both the exhaustive sampling and the parsimony model have the same underlying fundamental paradigm, namely that diverse situational contexts facilitate the same response. Probably because of the nearly universal use of nominally identical stimuli on repeated trials in learning research, we have very incomplete theoretical conceptions of how diverse experiences that call for the same response interact with each other in memory. Theories about aggregate effects in memory have been proposed for situations in which many varied physical objects or displays are given the same name or have been assigned, by fiat, to the same category, for example, prototype theories such as those of Attneave (1957) and Arnoult (1956) or computational theories such as that of Nosofsky (1988) . Unlike prototype formation (Rosch, 1978) , which involves central tendencies in natural categories, adequate theories of historical aggregation were not available for the case in which the same response is made to a variety of verbally described problem features, such as the shipping orders used by Rothkopf and Dashen (1995) or the probability problems used by Ross (1984 Ross ( , 1987 .
In the absence of adequate theories, we need to look to empirical facts. We wanted to know whether the ability of situational context to speed a decision is altered by experiences with other contexts and whether the exhaustive sampling or the parsimony model offer a better account of the effects of context changes. These were the main aims of the present study. An additional purpose was the replication of the Rothkopf and Dashen (1995) particularization studies including a test of the persistence of the particularization effect in time.
The chief experimental manipulation in our studies was the sequential order of two practice blocks which differed in modal context, that is, in the surface problem characteristics that were consistently linked with deep problem features. We carried out five experiments. All used decision time as chief dependent measures and were intended to decide between exhaustive sampling and the parsimony model. In the first three experiments, this was done by testing whether experiences with a new dominant problem context affected the reinstatement capability of surface features of earlier application problems. Experiment 4 was to find out whether the character of a later problem context affected the reinstatement capability of earlier surface context, that is, whether particularization effects were affected by the nature of subsequent application practice. Finally, in Experiment 5, sequence issues were generalized to the densities of co-occurrences between surface problem features and decisions in application practice. The purpose of Experiment 5 was to test whether both global and local densities of particularized problem features influence decision speeds. Evidence that recent local context densities are influential would favor the parsimony hypothesis.
Experiment 1
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to find out whether recency, as well as frequency, plays a role in the influence of situational context on decision speed. With exposure frequency of problem instances held constant, does restricted sampling from the problem feature space during the second half of application practice produce faster decision times on problems with these features than encountering such restricted problems in the first half of practice? Two experimental conditions were used for this purpose in a within-subject design: restricted sampling in the first half and unrestricted sampling in the second half (RU) and vice versa, that is, unrestricted sampling in the first half and restricted sampling in the second half (UR). In addition, we used two control conditions: restricted sampling throughout practice (RR) and unrestricted sampling throughout (UU).
Method Materials
The experimental vehicle was the three-bit classification task used by Rothkopf and Dashen (1995) and consisting of rule-governed, fictional shipping problems. Participants directed shipments to one of eight alternate routes (specified by color-designated key strokes) according to the following three binary classifications: (a) identity of sender-whether a firm or private person; (b) the nature of the cargo-whether manufactured nonfood or food; and (c) destination-whether foreign or domestic. The routing rules are shown in the Appendix. Each shipment feature could be instantiated in a very large number of ways. All shipping rules were mastered by participants prior to the beginning of the main experimental phases.
The computer that was used to generate the experimental problems stored 50 instances for each feature.
3 It was thus possible to generate 50 3 problems for each the eight routing solutions. Problems were generated and presented to each participant on an ATT 6312 WGS workstation, using the Micro-Experimental Lab (MEL) software package (Schneider, 1988) . A problem consisted of the presentation of a shipping transaction, that is, a concrete instantiation of shipper, cargo, and destination. The three terms were always on a single line on the screen and arranged from left to right in the order given above, for example, John Smith, oranges, Denmark. Participants indicated their routing decision with a single key stroke, the initial letter of the transshipment point identified a color, for example, R for transshipment point Red.
Treatments
Practice schedules were set up for each participant so that four of the routing rules were exercised by applying them to problems generated from a broad, unrestricted (U) pool of features, and the remaining four rules were practiced with a narrow, restricted (R) pool. The problem-generating algorithms for restricted and unrestricted problems are summarized in the left-hand panel (i.e., under PAR) of Table 1 .
If a rule was to be exercised with unrestricted problems, each of the three problem components was generated from a pool of 16 feature instances, creating a set of 16 3 possible problems. For a rule assigned to a restricted problem set, each problem component was generated from two instances.
Applications practice consisted of two phases. In the first phase, half of the rules were practiced exclusively with problems generated from the R and U algorithm respectively. In the second phase, half (2) of the rules that had been exercised with U problems in Phase 1 were now switched to R problems and half of the four rules that had been exercised with R problems were now switched to U. The remaining four rules were practiced with the same problem type in both phases. These arrangements resulted in four within-subject experimental conditions depending on assignments of problems to rules in Phases 1 and 2, respectively. These were: (a) RU: problems from restricted pool in Phase 1 and unrestricted pool in Phase 2; (b) UR: unrestricted pool in Phase 1 and restricted pool in Phase 2; (c) RR: restricted feature pool in both phases of the experiment; and (d) UU: problems in both phases were generated from the unrestricted feature pool. For each participant, two of the eight decision rules were exercised under each of the four experimental conditions.
Procedure
Participants were run individually, using general procedures similar to Rothkopf and Dashen (1995) . The experiment had five phases:
1. Warm-up and rule memorization. All participants were given a speed/ warm-up task to familiarize them with the keyboard and speedy responses to monitor displays. The warm-up task consisted of speeded judgments as to which of three simultaneously presented, screen-displayed words was the longest. After this, participants read a description of the experimental procedures, and then memorized the table of categorical rules (similar to the Appendix) until they demonstrated good mastery in three selfadministered tests.
2. Applications practice, Phase 1 . This phase consisted of 16 practice blocks. Each block consisted of 2 problems for each of the eight routing rules, in random order, for a total of 16 problems. The first block was run in "open book" format, that is, with the rule table available. All subsequent application practice blocks were solved from memory with corrective feedback for incorrect responses. Each problem had to be answered in 8 s. Interproblem interval was 0.5 s.
3. Application practice, Phase 2 (Blocks 17-32). As in Phase 1, 16 blocks of 16 problems were used. The algorithms by which problems were generated differed from those used in Phase 1 in the manner described in the Treatments section above.
4. Delay interval. A 10-min delay interval was interposed between the last application problem and the beginning of testing in order to reduce short-term memory effects. During that interval, participants were asked to circle and count misspelled words in a long prose passage as quickly as possible.
5. Testing. Two test blocks, each consisting of 64 problems, were administered immediately after the delay period. Test procedures were the same as in application practice but without corrective feedback.
Test Block 1 was designed to test for sequence effects and to detect associative linkages between triple-combinations of features and the use of particular rules. All eight problems used could be generated from the restricted feature sets by rules that were exercised under the RR, RU, and UR conditions (6 ϫ 8 ϭ 48). Test Block 1 also included 8 problems generated from the broad feature set for the two rules exercised under the UU condition (2 ϫ 8 ϭ 16), for a total of 64 problems.
Test Block 2 was designed to provide a test of the main findings reported by Rothkopf and Dashen (1995) . For the two rules exercised under the UU condition, 32 test problems were generated from the broad feature pool. For each of the two rules from the RR condition, 16 problems were generated from the restricted feature set, for a total of 64 problems in Test 2.
Participants
Paid student volunteers (N ϭ 36) were recruited from the university community. Rules and features designations were assigned unsystematically to participants.
Results

Application Practice
Accuracy. By the end of the first phase of the experiment (Block 16), proportions of correct decisions were .92 (RR), .92 (RU), .91 (UR), and .90 (UU). By Block 32, average accuracy was .97 (RR), .96 (RU), .97 (UR), and .95 (UU). Most errors were due to exceeding the 8-s time limit, although there were also a small number of misstruck keys.
Decision time. Average decision time on four-block units for correct responses only are shown for the four conditions in Figure 1 .
Decision time decreased approximately 2,000 ms during the 32 blocks of application practice. During the first 16 blocks, participants in the RR and RU conditions made decisions more rapidly, that is, rules applicable to a narrow problem pool were invoked faster than rules which were exercised on broad problem pools (UR and UU). The same was observed in the second half of the Note. The coding scheme for generating a problem in Experiments 1 and 2 was as follows: private shipper ϭ A; business shipper ϭ B; food cargo ϭ C; manufactured nonfood cargo ϭ D; domestic destination ϭ E; foreign destination ϭ F. For each of these categorical features, 50 instances were designated with a numeral, 1-50. No. ϭ the number of different problems that can be generated with this feature pool.
practice period. Performance under RR and UR treatments was faster than either RU or UU.
Posttests
Average decision time (in milliseconds) for the four treatments was as follows: UU ϭ 2,862; RU ϭ 2,602; UR ϭ 2,248; and RR ϭ 2,369. The UU average was from correctly solved problems that were generated from the unrestricted (broad) feature pool. For the other three conditions, the decision times are for correct responses to problems generated from the restricted feature set that were encountered respectively in the first (RU) or second (UR) half or throughout (RR) application practice. Comparison of RR with UU confirms the particularization effects described by Rothkopf and Dashen (1995) . Participants responded to RR items about 500 ms faster than UU problems, t(34) ϭ 6.20, p Ͻ .01.
The within-subject comparison between UR and RU indicated substantial order effects. The problems, generated from a restricted set of features that have been encountered in the second practice phase were solved more rapidly than problems generated from an earlier set of restricted features. Average decision time on problems from restricted sets was approximately 350 ms faster for the UR than the RU treatment, t(34) ϭ 4.21, p Ͻ .01.
No evidence was found within the conditions of this experiment that 64 exposures (32 blocks ϫ 2 problems per block) to the restricted feature set produced faster responses than only 32 exposures: RR ϭ 2,369 ms versus UR ϭ 2,248 ms, t(34) ϭ 1.30, p Ͼ .20.
Discussion
Experiment 1 confirmed previous findings that instances of features that were frequently seen in problems and consistently associated with the use of a particular rule were solved more rapidly than were problems generated from a broad pool of problem features.
We obtained evidence that the reinstatement capabilities of surface context depends on experiential history. Problems generated from restricted features seen during the second half of practice were responded to more quickly than were those with restricted features encountered in the first half of application practice but seen equally often. These results are broadly consistent with the parsimony hypothesis. Rothkopf and Dashen (1995) have proposed that frequent experience with problem features speeds decisions in two ways: (a) decoding/categorization, frequent exposure to a given instance of a feature results in its faster decoding and categorization, and (b) particularization, frequent and consistent linkage results in a direct associative connection between an instance of a feature and a particular rule or decision that short-cuts analytic processes and produces faster responses. Because frequent exposure and consistent linkage were deliberately confounded in Experiment 1, it cannot be concluded with certainty whether the observed order/ recency phenomenon involved decoding stages, particularization, or both. The magnitude of the observed order effects suggests that particularization played a role, but this is not certain, particularly because time-related decreases in decoding-enhancing repetition effects have been reported in the literature (Scarborough, Cortese, & Scarborough, 1977) . The purpose of Experiment 2 was to determine whether the observed order effects involved particularization processes.
Experiment 2
The main goal of Experiment 2 was to decide whether the order/recency effects observed in Experiment 1 were due to (a) particularization, that is, the short-cutting of analytic algorithms because of learned direct association between features and particular routing decisions, or (b) faster decoding/classification of features from the restricted pool due to their frequent exposure. This was done by closely replicating two of the practice conditions of the first experiment and including, in addition, a frequency-ofexposure control condition. This control condition matched the particularization treatment in the frequency with which restricted feature instances were encountered but differed in that the instances were not exclusively associated with the exercise of a single rule.
Method Materials
The materials and experimental technique were identical to Experiment 1. Experiment 2 used two within-subject conditions (RU and UR) and two between-subject conditions: particularization experimental treatment (PAR) and the frequency-of-exposure control (FOX).
Treatments
The features that served as category instances in the restricted problem set were seen with exactly the same frequency in both the experimental and control treatments, but co-occurrence between specific instantiations and the applicability of a particular rule was twice as great in the experimental treatment than in the control. This was done by assigning each restricted feature instance exclusively to a single rule for PAR and assigning each Figure 1 . Changes in decision time during the course of application practice in Experiment 1 for the four treatment conditions. The data points shown are average decision times over four successive practice blocks. The arrow indicates that the problem generation schemes changed for the RU and UR conditions after Block 16. U ϭ unrestricted; R ϭ restricted.
restricted feature instance to two rules for FOX. For example, A1 (e.g., John Smith) was exclusively associated with the ACE rule in the experimental treatment, whereas in the control condition, it was assigned to both the ACE and the ADF routing.
The problem-generating scheme is shown in the right-hand panel (i.e., under "Control") of Table 1 . For experimental participants, problems for rules in the restricted condition were generated from pools of two feature instances for each of the 3 problem components for a total of 8 (2 ϫ 2 ϫ 2) problem combinations. For the control treatment, problems for a restricted rule were generated from a pool of four feature instances per component. These four feature instances were shared by two restricted rules. There were 64 (4 ϫ 4 ϫ 4) problem combinations for each restricted rule in the control treatment.
For both treatments, half of the rules were exercised with a restricted problem-generating algorithm in Blocks 1-16 and with problems from unrestricted feature pools (actually 16) during Blocks 17-32 (RU). The other four rules were exercised with problems from the unrestricted pools in Blocks 1-16 and from the restricted pools in Blocks 17-32 (UR).
Testing
A test, consisting of 128 problems without corrective feedback, was administered 10 min after application practice. The 10-min delay interval was spent doing the text-checking task used in Experiment 1.
The test consisted of (a) 64 (8 ϫ 8) problems generated from the restricted feature pool of the rules that had been exercised under the restricted rule condition by that participant in the first or second half of application practice and (b) 64 problems generated from the unrestricted feature pools of the eight routing rules.
Participants
Volunteer undergraduate students (N ϭ 48) were paid for their services. Half were assigned to the experimental and control conditions, respectively.
Results
Application Practice
Decision times, averaged over four-block units during application practice, are shown for the four main experimental conditions in Figure 2 . Decision times on restricted problem sets were faster than on problems drawn from large feature pools. In the second half of application practice, when routing choices (which had heretofore been applied to problems generated from unrestricted feature sets) were switched to restricted sets and vice versa, the observed decision times quickly reflected the new conditions. Differences between problems generated from restricted and unrestricted feature sets were greater for the experimental (PAR) than for the control (FOX) condition. Further statistical analysis of these data is provided in the section on Experiment 3.
Accuracy in all combinations of the three factors-phase, problem scheme, and treatment-were 96% correct or greater. Nearly all errors were decision times that exceeded the 8-s cut-off or misstrikes.
Testing
Average decision times for various categories of correctly solved test problems are shown in Table 2 . For the PAR, problems generated from restricted features were solved 175 ms faster than those generated from unrestricted features, t(23) ϭ 3.01, p Ͻ .01.
For the control condition, the difference between the two types of problems (58 ms), although consistent in direction with previous findings of decoding effects, was not statistically reliable, t(23) ϭ 1.53, p Ͼ .10. All t tests above were for correlated means.
The order effects were largely due to particularization rather than decoding/categorization. This was concluded because PAR showed stronger historical effects than FOX. In PAR, solutions of restricted feature problems from the UR condition were 146 ms faster than those from RU condition, t(23) ϭ 2.63, p Ͻ .02, whereas in the control treatment solutions under the UR were only 81 ms faster than RU, t(23) ϭ 1.13, p Ͼ .25. A more exacting test of the contribution of decoding/categorization speed-up to order effects is made in the section on Experiment 3.
Discussion
Experiment 2 confirmed the order/recency effects obtained in Experiment 1, namely that problems generated from restricted features seen during the second half of application practice were solved more rapidly than problems generated from features restricted during the first half of practice. The order effect appears to be largely due to particularization rather than decoding/classification because it was much larger in PAR than in FOX. It is more closely linked to co-occurrence than frequency. Memories of recent (or last) application episodes were more influential than those of earlier experiences in displacing or simplifying algorithmic procedures.
The observed order/recency effects in particularization may have been due to several, not necessarily mutually exclusive, causes. These include the following: (a) The problem features encountered in the most recent application episodes have an especially privileged memorial status, perhaps somewhat like the most recent entry in a push-down file, or (b) intervening experience with problems generated from the broad feature pool reduced particularization effects created during the application episodes in the first half of the practice problems. Both of these historical effects would be consistent with the parsimony hypothesis. Another possibility, however, is that decisions about restricted items from the UR treatment were faster than from RU because the time interval between restricted problem practice and testing was approximately 30 min longer for the RU than the UR condition because the second half of practice was closer to testing in time. Timerelated decrease in activation of memorial representations is predicted by Schunn et al.'s (1997) source of activation confusion (SAC) model and can also be adduced from simple forgetting models. For this reason, the test interval or activation decay hypothesis could not be ruled out. We undertook to test this hypothesis in Experiment 3.
Experiment 3
The purpose of Experiment 3 was to determine whether the order effects observed in the first two experiments were due to unequal practice-test intervals in the RU and UR conditions. This conjecture was tested by interposing a long time interval (24 hr) between application practice and testing. According to Schunn et al. (1997) , this should result in all feature nodes returning to base activation levels or it should bring forgetting to asymptotic levels. If the historical order effects had been due to deactivation or forgetting, a prolonged time interval between application practice and testing should cause RU-UR differences to diminish or disappear.
Method Procedure, Materials, and Design
Experiment 3 was exactly like Experiment 2 except that a 24-hr interval was interposed between application practice and testing. The experimental and control treatments were the same. For each treatment, half of the decision principles were practiced under the UR and the RU conditions, respectively.
Participants
Paid graduate and undergraduate student volunteers (n ϭ 16) were unsystematically assigned to each of the two treatments, for a total N of 32.
Results
Application Practice
Decision-time data for the first and second half of application practice are shown in Table 3 . During the second half of application practice, in the experimental treatment, problems generated from restricted features were solved 329 ms faster than problems generated from the broad feature pools. For the control group, the effect of restricted feature sampling was less than half as large (99 ms).
These Experiment 3 data were combined with an equal number of equivalent observations from Experiment 2. The combined results, also shown in Table 3 , were subjected to a 2 ϫ 2 ϫ 2 analysis of variance (ANOVA). There were two within-subject factors (practice phase: first vs. second; problems scheme: RU vs. UR) and one between-subjects factor (experimental vs. control). The analysis showed that Phase (i.e., the speeding of decision time with practice) was the only significant main effect, F(1, 62) ϭ 291.28, p Ͻ .01, MSE ϭ 175,880. Also significant was the interaction between phase and problems scheme, F(1, 62) ϭ 62.27, p Ͻ .01, MSE ϭ 24,403, which shows the effects of switching from U to R and vice versa. The triple interaction, Phase ϫ Problems Scheme ϫ Treatment, was also reliable, F(1, 62) ϭ 21.76, p Ͻ .01, MSE ϭ 24,403, as would be expected if restricted problem sampling produced substantially stronger particularization than encoding/classification effects.
Testing
Twenty-four hr later, the encoding/categorization effect had dissipated. We concluded this because average decision times for restricted problems (2,888 ms) and unrestricted problems (2,881 ms) were nearly equal in the control treatment (FOX). Particularization effects, however, were still strong. In the experimental Note. PAR ϭ particularized experimental condition; FOX ϭ frequencyof-exposure control condition; U ϭ unrestricted; R ϭ restricted; R:RU ϭ R item after the RU sequence application practice; R:UR ϭ R item after the UR sequence application practice. Note. PAR ϭ particularized experimental condition; FOX ϭ frequencyof-exposure control condition; Exp. ϭ Experiment; R ϭ restricted; U ϭ unrestricted.
treatment, restricted problems (2,547 ms) were solved 319 ms faster than unrestricted problems (2,866 ms), t(15) ϭ 5.26, p Ͻ .001. The order effect (i.e., the difference between UR and RU) maintained itself throughout the 24-hr delay period in PAR. Results are shown in Figure 3 . Average decision time for restricted problems was 2,656 ms for the RU condition and 2,441 ms for UR, t(15) ϭ 3.39, p Ͻ .01. The observed order effect was here actually slightly larger than that observed 10 min after application practice. In FOX, differences between RU (2,858) and UR (2,913) were small, unreliable, and in the wrong directions, t(15) ϭ .85, p Ͼ .4. These results strongly support the parsimony hypothesis.
Discussion
This experiment produced two major findings. First, it is the only study known to us in which particularization effects were observed as long as 24 hr after application experiences. This indicates that the speeding of decisions that resulted from consistent links between surface problem features and rule choices was supported by stable associative structures rather than by attentional or other transitory excitation mechanisms. However, decoding and categorization speeding, because of repeated exposures to problem features, appear to have largely disappeared after 24 hr.
Second, the order/recency phenomena observed earlier were found to persist for at least 24 hr, an interval that dwarfed the interval between the two experiential episodes in the first two experiments (24 hr vs. approximately 20 min). Memories of problem instances encountered last in a long string of application episodes were more influential than those from earlier problems even 24 hr after application practice. Therefore, the observed order effect could not have been due exclusively to spontaneous shortterm decay of memory traces in time or time-dependent decay of activation but rather was produced by a memorial mechanism that favored the context of the last in a series of application episodes. The order effect was consistent with the parsimony hypothesis. Decision makers behaved as if the reinstating memories of feature instances were in a push-down stack. The topmost (last-seen) feature elements were more readily accessible and led to faster decisions. Stack structure persisted for at least 24 hr. Special adaptation to the most contemporary problem context would be a useful mechanism because it sensitizes decision makers to the current state of the problem world.
These findings suggest modifications of network models such as SAC, proposed by Schunn et al. (1997) . In this model, recent episodic experience with a problem feature results in increased activation of the network node that represents it. But this activation is assumed to decay quickly in time and the node soon returns to its base activation level, which depends primarily on historic frequency of exposure.
Experiment 4
The first three experiments clearly showed that the capability of a dominant surface context to reinstate a given decision rule was reduced by subsequent experiences with other contexts. The pur- pose of Experiment 4 was to find out whether these changes in reinstatement capability are determined by the specific nature of these subsequent experiences. We asked whether the capability of a narrow context to reinstate a decision is altered by subsequent practice with a new, restricted set of surface problem features. In this experiment, practice in applying rules to problems generated from a restricted, particularized set of attributes (R1), was followed by application practice with either (a) another, new set of particularized problems generated from different, restricted attributes (R2) or (b) problems generated from a new broad pool of attributes (U). This yielded two experimental treatments: R1R2 and R1U.
It should be noted that U differed from R2 in that (a) diverse new problems for a rule were generated from a large pool of feature instances rather than a few, (b) each of the feature instances was only encountered a few times rather than many, and (c) any repeatedly seen feature instances were not exclusively linked to a single rule. Slower decision for the R1R2 treatment on a subsequent test on R1 problems would be predicted by a competition theory such as that of Anderson and Schooler (1991) . According to their view, memories are consulted in the order of the odds that they have been needed in the past. Decision times are longer when there are more memories with equal or greater odds, as would be the case in R1R2 because the number of features that were strongly associated with a particular decision rule have been doubled. In R1U, however, the strongly linked R1 problem features compete with the diverse, weakly linked context features that have been encountered in U. Anderson and Schooler's (1991) need/odds concept is described in somewhat greater detail in the General Discussion section.
Method Materials
The materials and experimental technique were identical to those used in Experiment 3. In Experiment 4, however, we used only PAR. Two treatments, R1R2 and R1U, were used in a within-subject design. For each participant, four rules were assigned to each of the two conditions, R1R2 and R1U.
Treatments
In R1R2, a particularized problem-generating scheme, which included a 2 ϫ 2 ϫ 2 restricted set of attribute instances, similar to the preceding experiments, was used to generate problems (R1) in the first 16 practice blocks. A second, nonoverlapping set of 2 ϫ 2 ϫ 2 restricted feature instances was used to create the problem set (R2) for the practice Blocks 17-32. Rules assigned to the R1U condition were treated in the same way in the first 16 blocks as R1R2, but problems for Blocks 17-32 were generated by drawing with replacement from a broad (20 ϫ 20 ϫ 20) pool of attributes. The problem-generating scheme is shown in Table 4 .
Testing
A test, consisting of 128 problems without corrective feedback, was administered 10 min after application practice. The 10-min delay interval was spent in the text-checking task used in Experiment 1.
The test consisted of 64 (8 ϫ 8) problems generated from the restricted attribute instance pool of the rules that had been exercised under restricted rule (particularized) condition by that participant either in the first half (R1) or second half (R2) of application practice. The other 64 problems were generated from the unrestricted feature pools of the eight routing rules. The critical dependent measure was decision time on R1 problems.
Participants
Volunteer undergraduate and graduate students (N ϭ 32) were paid for their services.
Results
Application Practice
Decision times during application practice are shown in Figure 4 . They closely resembled those observed in the earlier experiments.
Testing
During testing, average response accuracy was .95, .93, and .94 for R1, R2, and U problems, respectively.
Average decision time for the unseen, unrestricted problems (U) during testing was 3,229 ms (SE ϭ 115). The most important finding of Experiment 4 was that average decision time for R1 problems that had been encountered during the first half of application practice was 116 ms longer, t(31) ϭ 2.24, p Ͻ .04, for the R1R2 (3,098 ms, SE ϭ 116) condition than for R1U (2,982 ms, SE ϭ 130). This suggested that the new restricted context in the second half of applications practice had retroactive effects on responses to the problem features that had been encountered in the first half. Experiences with a new, narrow problem context reduced the reinstating (particularization) effect of an earlier restricted problem context (R1) more than further practice experiences with more diverse problems (U). The particularization effect Note. The coding scheme for generating a problem in Experiment 4 was as follows: private shipper ϭ A; business shipper ϭ B; food cargo ϭ C; manufactured nonfood cargo ϭ D; domestic destination ϭ E; foreign destination ϭ F. For each of these categorical features, 50 instances were designated with a numeral, 1-50. R1R2 ϭ a different set of restricted attribute instances in the first and second half of the experiment; R1U ϭ restricted set of attribute instances in the first half and unrestricted set in the second half of the experiment.
in R1 was modified by the character of subsequent practice episodes in the application of rules. Some particularization effects remained, however, because the R1 in the R1R2 condition was still 131 ms faster than problems generated from the unrestricted feature pool (U). Decision time for R2 problems was 3,024 ms (SE ϭ 117). This is 74 ms faster than for R1 problems from the first half of the R1R2 conditions, but this difference was not statistically reliable, t(31) ϭ 1.36, p Ͼ .18.
Discussion
The major findings of Experiment 4 suggest a historical aggregation mechanism, consistent with the parsimony hypothesis. Recent experiential densities of problem instances appear to modify the memorial consequences of earlier densities or perhaps of historic, long-standing (global) densities. This may be because (a) memories of various reinstating contexts interact with each other in the manner of a push-down file, that is, nodes of more recently particularized feature elements are more accessible than those particularized earlier, or (b) the reinstating effects of a given context on decision speed is diminished by increases in the number of other, potentially reinstating contexts. The second account is consistent with the needs/odds conception advanced by Anderson and Schooler (1991) , which is essentially a competition theory. It proposes that the accessibility of any memory depends on the experienced likelihood of being evoked relative to other relevant memories. In the R1R2 treatment, the probability of any R1 problem instance was the same as any R2 instance. In the R1U condition, however, every R1 instance had a higher aggregate probability than any of the infrequently seen U problem instances.
Experiment 5 was designed to test the interaction between recent local and global practice densities by holding constant the number of particularized features (i.e., reinstating contexts) and their global encounter frequencies and varying only the sequential distribution of particularizing episodes.
Experiment 5
Experiment 5 was intended as a test of a general historical model of particularization effects on decision times. A plausible interpretation of the results of the first four experiments is that particularization is determined both by (a) the global proportion of the uses of the relevant decision principle with the particular problem instance and by (b) the most recent (local) value of that proportion. The global proportion (or density) is the aggregate number of times that a specific problem feature instantiation has been encountered in the past, divided by the total number of problems to which the relevant solution principle has been applied. The local density is this proportion for some subsection of the total practice sequence. In the first three experiments, local densities were the same as local densities. However, local proportions or densities may not be uniform throughout all application experiences. Under certain conditions they may differ sharply from their global value. When the most recent contingent problem feature distribution differs substantially from the historical contingent distribution, this local distribution may also influence response speed.
4 Such a model of learning about context would be adaptive because it attunes decision making to temporary, as well as to permanent, states of the problem world. The essence of this implicit induction model is that recent distributions of instance frequencies are likely to be influential despite historical averages. It seems reasonable that the experiential densities of recent episodes should eventually merge with historical densities, but a model of how this happens must await future experimentation.
Experiment 5 was intended to test the conjecture that global and local densities of problem instantiation interact in memory to determine the reinstatement effects of surface problem contexts. The logic of the experiment was to arrange for several global densities for particular problem instances and to experimentally manipulate the sequence of encounters with problem instances that generated each of these global densities. In this way, it was possible to increase or decrease local densities during practice while keeping the aggregate, global densities constant or to maintain local densities at a uniform level. By manipulating both global and local instance densities, we could measure whether they interacted in determining decision speed.
Method
Materials and Procedure
The materials and general procedures of Experiments 1-4 were used, except that the problems for each particularized condition were generated from four instance values for each problem feature instead of two.
Treatments
Application practice consisted of 32 blocks of 16 problems each, for a total of 512 problems. Two treatment variables conditions, global and local experience density, were manipulated in an incompletely crossed, within- Figure 4 . Average decision time during application practice in Experiment 4. R1R2 ϭ different restricted attribute set in first and second half of experiment; R1U ϭ restricted attribute set in first half and unrestricted in second half of the experiment. subject, factorial design. Three levels of global experience densities (GED), .50, .25, and .125, and three variation in local densities (VLD), with global densities held constant, were used. The treatments are described below. Details are shown in Table 5 .
GED. Each rule was required 64 times during the course of practice. The global densities were the proportion of times with which a particular problem feature instance occurred in the set of 64 problems for which a given rule was appropriate. In the three global conditions, these densities were .50 (32), .25 (16), and .125 (8)-the numbers in parentheses are the frequencies with which a particular experimental feature instance was encountered in the 64 uses of a rule. In terms of total practice events (N ϭ 512), these frequencies corresponded to proportions of .063, .031, and .016 (frequency of instance divided by total number of problems), respectively.
VLD. The VLD conditions differed in how the frequency of a particular problem feature instance was distributed through four successive sets of eight application practice blocks. In the even (E) condition, feature instance densities were the same in all four sets and the same as the global density (i.e., either .50, .25, or .125) throughout practice. Two other local variation treatments were used. In treatment 50D/25I (read .50 decreasing, .25 increasing) the local density of the highest global density condition (GED ϭ .50) decreased from .75 to 0 during the four practice segments, and the local density of the GED ϭ .25 condition increased from 0 to .75. In treatment 50I/25D (read .50 increasing, .25 decreasing) the local density of the highest global density condition (GED ϭ .50) increased from 0 to .75 and local density of the GED ϭ .25 condition decreased from .75 to 0, during the four practice segments. Problem feature instances under the GED ϭ .125 appeared with uniform density throughout practice. For this condition local density always equaled global density (.125). The total frequencies of exposure to attribute values was held constant for all three treatments.
Problems for two of the rules were generated under each of the three particularized VLD conditions (E, 50D/25I, 50I/25D) and for two rules using the U control treatment. In the U condition, problems were generated at random, without replacement, from pools of 16 feature values for each attribute, throughout application practice. In the particularized treatments, 4 particular feature values were used for each of the three attributes of each rule (e.g., A1-A4, C1-C4, E1-E4 for ACE). Four problems were generated from these, and each attribute value was used only once.
Testing. A 128-item test was administered approximately 15 min after the completion of application practice. During that interval, participants were engaged in a speeded proofreading task. The test consisted of 32 experimentally restricted instances seen during application practice and 96 that were generated from an instance pool that had not been seen before.
Participants. Undergraduate and graduate student volunteers (N ϭ 25) were paid to participate in the study. Four participants had to be eliminated from the analysis because of equipment failures.
Results
Average decision times during testing for the various global and local density conditions are shown in Figure 5 . As expected, decision time decreased monotonically with global density for the E conditions, in which local problem feature densities were the same as global densities throughout practice, F(2, 40) ϭ 3.49, p Ͻ .05, MSE ϭ 410,750.
The interplay between local and global experience densities can also be seen in Figure 5 . For problem features with a global density of .25 (GED ϭ .25), decision speed changed with variations in local density. When global density was .25, decision time was fastest (2,081 ms, SE ϭ 77 ms) when local densities started at 0 and ended at .75 in the final practice blocks (i.e., 50D/25I; see Table 5 ). Decision speed was much slower (2,377 ms, SE ϭ 80 ms) for problem context distributions that started with a local density of .75 and ended with zero (i.e., 50I/25D). Decision speed was 2,253 ms (SE ϭ 81 ms) for the E treatment, in which local densities were the same as global densities (.25) throughout practice.
Similarly, when global density was .50, if the local density increased during practice (50I/25D), problems were responded to more rapidly (1,986 ms, SE ϭ 95 ms) than if the local density decreased during practice (50D/25I; 2,131 ms, SE ϭ 97 ms). An ANOVA (2 global ϫ 3 variations of local densities) with repeated measures was performed on these data. Global density had a reliable effect on decision time, F(1, 20) ϭ 5.27, p Ͻ .05, MSE ϭ 612,864, but variation in local density were not significant, F(1, 20) ϭ 0.97, ns. As expected, there was a reliable interaction between global density and local variation in density, F(1, Note. GED ϭ global experience density; VLD ϭ variable local density; Freq. ϭ Frequency; Dens. ϭ Density; E ϭ even; LD ϭ GED throughout practice; 50D/25I ϭ decreasing LD for GED ϭ .500 and increasing LD for GED ϭ .250. The obverse was true for 50I/25D. 20) ϭ 12.46, p Ͻ .005, MSE ϭ 1,023,231. The condition in which GED ϭ .125 was not used in this analysis because local density was held constant throughout practice in that condition.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 5 show that both global and local densities of context features during application experiences influence their reinstatement capacity as measured by decision speed. The simple effect that global density increases decision speed was shown by the results from the E treatment, in which local and global densities were the same. The effects of local density were shown in that problem instantiations of the same global densities were solved more rapidly if the greatest local densities occurred toward the end of practice. However, some caution in conclusions about local densities are indicated because the effects of densities early and late in practice were confounded. For example, the 50D/25I treatment differed from the 50I/25D condition not only in the problem density for the last practice segment but also in the early practice segment densities of problems that occurred with GED ϭ .50. The confounding was necessitated because the experimental design fixed the number of problems at a constant (16) in each block of application practice.
General Discussion
Adventitious co-occurrence can associatively link surface problem features to deep problem features that support a particular solution, even though these surface features were consistent with other solutions as well. The linkages manifested themselves during rule-guided problem solving by speeding of a specific decision in particular problem instances. Rothkopf and Dashen (1995) interpreted the speeding as a context reinstatement phenomena, which they called particularization. Results from the present studies were consistent with their interpretation and showed, in addition, that context reinstatement by surface problem features can persist for at least 24 hr.
5 Other context-like effects, in reading inverted text, have been reported to persist for over 1 year (Kolers, 1976) .
Our five experiments and their outcomes are summarized in Table 6 . Our most important new result is that the reinstatement capability of various experienced situational contexts were not independent of each other. Experiences with a new dominant situational context for a rule-guided decision depressed the accessibility of earlier memorial links between surface contexts and decisions. These conclusions are based on the findings, in the first three experiments, that a more recently established context was more accessible than earlier reinstating surface features. In Experiment 4, we found that a strongly established, new context reduced the reinstating capability of an earlier dominant context more than did a sequel that involved a broad sampling of diverse problem features. The results of Experiment 5 further demonstrated that the sequential history of application episodes influenced decision speed. We were able to show that particularization was determined not only by the absolute frequency (global density) of surfacefeature:decision-pairings but by the distribution of these pairings in the practice period (local densities).
Our findings demonstrated historical dependence among context-establishing experiences and were therefore consistent with the parsimony model of the effects of context changes. They require the rejection of the exhaustive sampling model. The dominance and influence of later practice episodes suggest something like a push-down file as a model for the aggregation of episodic context in memory. Earlier contexts can still reinstate but later contexts are more effective.
Before discussing possible theoretical interpretation of these effects of context changes, it is first necessary to deal with two kinds of objections that may be raised about the conclusions above. Both are based on alternative interpretations of our data. The first objection might be that the sequence UR resulted in greater decision speed for restricted problems than RU because contextestablishing practice was closer in time to the test. This interpretation can be rejected for two reasons: (a) Experiment 3 showed faster cuing for UR than RU even though testing was delayed by 24 hr, and (b) in Experiment 4, context reinstatement resulted in faster test decisions in the R1U than in the R1R2 condition even 5 In the first four experiments, as in a previous study (Rothkopf & Dashen, 1995) , we also explored a conjecture (following Dosher & Rosedale, 1989 ) that combinations of problem features become memorylinked retrieval cues. This was tested by comparing combinations of familiar problem features that had been seen during practice with combinations that had not been seen. No evidence for combination effects were found. For brevity these results were not reported in detail. In the 50D/25I condition, the high global density items (.50) decreased from an initial local density of .75 to 0, whereas medium (.25) density items increased from an initial local density of 0 to .75. The inverse was true for the 50I/25D treatment. For details, see Table 5. though the interval between R1 and testing was the same in both treatments.
An important, additional objection may be prompted by observations in Experiments 1-3 that the particularized problem instances were responded to 330 -567 ms more slowly at the end of the first 16 practice blocks (RU) than the particularized problem instances on the 32nd practice block (UR). This could be interpreted as meaning that the observed differences on the subsequent test between first and second half contexts (e.g., RU vs. UR) were simply due to differences in performance levels achieved during practice.
6 Among the reasons why this is not an acceptable argument is the very plausible assumption that increases in speed because of practice involve both general and experiment-specific factors for experimentally restricted items, whereas it involved only general factors for the U condition. General factors include those performance components that are exercised in every practice event regardless of its character, such as accommodations to the general experimental situation, preparatory set, and the physical mechanics of key stroking. Item-specific factors, however, include the formation of direct associative links between surface features and decisions that result from repeated practice experiences with particular problem instances. Gains due to practice in the U condition(s) are nearly entirely due to general factors, because problem instances are generated from a large item pool and therefore problem instances are rarely repeated. General factors, and not item-specific learning, must also have been largely responsible for performance speed increases on experimental, restricted problems during the last 16 blocks of practice, as shown in Figures 1, 2 , and 4. This is because the differences between Blocks 16 and 32 in performance on restricted problems are about the same magnitude as the speed increases for the solution of U problems. Consequently, the observed decision speed differences between Blocks 16 and 32 in the two conditions cannot be simply attributed to differences in learning of the item-specific factor, which is the factor of main interest in the present work. The above facts argue strongly against the conjecture that the observed test difference between restricted items from the first and second half of practice were simply due to differences in practice achievement levels.
A more appropriate test of whether the same level of specific learning has been reached on Blocks 16 and 32 are the relative standings of the restricted and unrestricted conditions. This can be estimated by subtracting response speed of the restricted from the unrestricted items on Block 16 and 32, respectively, for the relevant experimental conditions. Differences between R and U items at the end of the first and second half of practice, respectively, for the first three experiments were as follows: Experiment 1, 296 and 547 ms; Experiment 2, 316 and 198 ms; Experiment 3, 327 and 329 ms. Only in Experiment 1 is the difference between restricted and unrestricted substantially greater at Block 32 than at Block 16. In Experiment 2, the difference is actually reversed. These data do 6 This conjecture rests on ambiguities in current conceptions of the relationship between what is learned (as indexed by dependent measures such as reaction speed) and the nature of the practice events. The dilemma for someone trying to equate learning in two tasks under laboratory conditions is that holding practice (e.g., trials) the same may result in different reaction speed or accuracy. If resultant performance, such as speed or accuracy, is to be matched, the two tasks may require different amounts of practice. Note. Notations for Experiments 1-4 are explained in the text. For Experiment 5, "Rh," "Rm," and "Rl" refer to high, medium, and low global densities, respectively. The suffixes "I" and "D" refer to increasing and decreasing local densities. "E" refers to "even" and means that global and local densities were the same. R ϭ restricted; U ϭ unrestricted; PAR ϭ particularized experimental condition; FOX ϭ frequency-of-exposure condition; R1R2 ϭ a different set of attribute instances in the first and second half of experiment. Thus the RhI, RhD, and RhE refer to high global density conditions with increasing, decreasing, and even local densities, respectively. RmI, RmD, and RmE refer to medium global densities with three local trends, and RIE means low global densities and constant global densities.
not support the unequal-learning-level hypothesis. Instead these differences between the RU and UR conditions probably reflect general learning factors that are common to restricted and unrestricted items. Another finding which militates even more decisively against attributing the observed historical effects to differences in achievement levels comes from Experiment 4. Both conditions were treated exactly the same during the first 16 practice blocks, and this treatment resulted in the same performance on R1 in both conditions on Block 16 (see Figure 4 ). Yet R1 decision speeds differed between the two treatments on the subsequent test because of the nature of practice Blocks 17-32.
A Theory
All of our experiments showed that changes in modal situational context for a rule-guided decision affected the accessibility of earlier memorial links between surface contexts and decisions. The most commonly invoked theoretical device for the historical aggregation of experiences are the excitation/interference mechanics that have evolved around switching/competition models of learning (e.g., Melton & Irwin, 1940; Postman & Underwood, 1973) , but this does not seem a suitable model for particularization phenomena. More fitting theoretical formulations are the episodic model for automaticity of Logan (1988) and the strategic model (Schunn et al., 1997) of episodic influences in rule-guided decisions. Both of these theoretical models would have to be amended to accommodate our findings that both global and local frequencies of context:decision pairing determine the speed with which context reinstates decisions. Logan's (1988) interesting model of expert performance posits a race between episodic memories and algorithmic processes and postulates that the likelihood of episodic memories outracing the algorithmic processes in decision making depends on the diversity and frequency of previous encounters with problem instances. Episodic memories become more useful as more of the problem space is sampled. This is an exhaustive sampling model rather than a parsimony conception. But it could be modified to account for the joint effects of local and global experience statistics by weighting recent application episodes more heavily than earlier.
The more elaborate strategic model that has been developed in Reder's laboratory (Reder & Schunn, 1996; Schunn et al., 1997) has focused mainly on episodic effects in solving arithmetic or arithmetic-like problems, but seems potentially useful in accounting for the interplay between context-driven, direct associations and constructive processes in recall and decision making. According to this model, a strategic state, the "feeling of knowing" (FOK) determines whether problem solvers engage in calculation or retrieve answers directly from memory. FOK acts as a switch that selects either the fast retrieve or the slower calculate. The setting of the switch (i.e., FOK) is determined by activation in memory of nodes corresponding to various problem elements. Base level of activation for these nodes is determined by global frequencies of past exposures to problem components. Activation levels are raised above base levels by recent exposures but return to it with the passage of time. This model predicts that both frequent and recent exposure to problem features will lead to a feeling of knowing and therefore to decisions to retrieve. It could be amended, however, to account for our finding that the observed push-down order effects were relatively persistent in time.
An Adaptive Process
The shipping task used in our experiments resembles many practical situations that involve principle-based selection of procedures or classification on the basis of multiple criteria. In these situations, a great variety of surface problem forms are often conceptually equivalent. In order to apply the appropriate decision principle, problem solvers have to identify the relevant surface elements in these settings and then use these to determine deep problem features that are critical to their decisions. The key fact on which the work on particularization is hinged is that the incidence of various relevant and irrelevant surface forms that lead to the inference of a deep feature is not necessarily equal and balanced. There are situational or temporal biases in incidence and in adventitious correlations with appropriate decisions, and there are inequalities in the surface representation of decision-relevant conceptualizations. These situational or temporal biases may change (often radically) with circumstances. What we have investigated in the present studies is decision makers' sensitivity to situational biases and inequalities in surface representations and their sensitivity to changes in situational bias. The particularization phenomenon involves inductive processes that can signal changes in the problem world and may be the precursors to revisions of learned decision algorithms. The observed push-down effects suggest that the human nervous system favors contemporary demands by making representations of current (or recent) contextual settings more accessible in memory than those of earlier application episodes. Particularization may belong to that class of psychological capabilities that have evolved to deal efficiently with environmental demands on memory. Anderson and Schooler (1991) have offered an insightful account of psychological mechanisms that have been shaped by constancies in environmental demands. They have characterized environmental demands on memory as need/odds and have shown that reaction time decreases with increased need/odds. They define need/odds, q, as p/(1 Ϫ p), where the need probability, p, is calculated from the relative frequency of requirements to consult a particular memory. The global frequency manipulations in Experiment 5 are proportional to p values. Our density measures are equivalent to q. Anderson and Schooler have proposed that memories are examined in order of odds and that the time required to examine a memory with odds q will be proportional to the number of memories with odds greater than q. The modifications in decision time through particularization, that we have observed in the present studies, are the consequence of historical aggregation of application experiences in memory. This aggregation supports the inductive determination of need/odds. The need/odds conception can account for the historical effects observed in the first four experiments because in every one of these studies the experiences in the second half of practice lowered q for problem features and their associative linkages encountered during the first half. The results of Experiment 5 indicate a somewhat more complex picture, however. If q were calculated on the basis of global densities alone, all three local density conditions would have resulted in the same decision times. Nor would the calculation of need/odds, based only on global, life-time statistics of demands, make good adaptive sense in an inconstant world. The needs/odds model could accommodate these considerations, as well as the local density findings in Experiment 5, by specifying an experience window for which q is calculated. Both Anderson and Schooler and Schunn et al. (1997) postulate mechanisms for the decay of memory trace strength in time. The right quantitative assumptions about this decay should make it possible to specify the appropriate dimensions of a window from which q might be calculated to account for the observed recency effects.
Conclusion
Surface problem features and contextual elements can become associatively linked with choices of particular solutions or solution procedures. This can happen when problems with these surface problem characteristics are frequently and consistently solved according to a particular principle and have the deep features on which the principle hinges. This kind of adventitious associative linking, which we have called particularization, results in simplification or elimination of analytic processes. The shortening of decision time as a consequence of particularizing practice is thought to take place because direct associative access to solutions requires less time than algorithmic processes. We reason further that after mastery of solution principles, the average speed with which a problem is solved depends on the relative proportion of (a) algorithm users and (b) those who solve through direct associative processes. Such analysis is generally consistent with conclusions drawn from the work of Logan (1988) , Baylis (1991a, 1991b) , Reder and Schunn (1996) , Ross (1987) , and others, namely that experts derive their competence not only from analytic processes but also from direct associations that are acquired through many specific practice episodes. Our data require elaboration of earlier models in that we found that direct (facilitated) access to a solution for a given instance is determined not only by (a) the historical, global frequency distribution of problem feature instances to which the decision principle has been applied but also by (b) the recent, local frequency distribution of such instances. These two factors interact to set the average speed with which a well-mastered rule is applied to a given instance or a problem. They provide one of the mechanisms by which humans can adapt to changing situational demands.
Two important general implications may be derived from our experiments. First, our finding that the reinstating capacities of earlier context were diminished by experiences with subsequent contexts, although here obtained by manipulating surface features that were logically linked to rule-governed problems, may also hold for more general reinstating contexts such as locations or situations. Second, the observation that performance was influenced by both global and local experience frequencies challenges a long-respected canon in learning theory, namely that aggregate learning effects are independent of the historical texture of instructive experiences.
